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Abstract
Today, network technologies can handle throughputs or up to 100 Gbps, transport-
ing 200 million packets per second on a single link. Such high bandwidths impact 
network flow analysis and as a result require significantly more powerful hardware. 
Methods used today concentrate mainly on analyses of data flows and patterns. It is 
nearly impossible to actively look for anomalies in network packets and flows. A small 
amount of change of monitoring patterns could result in big increase in potentially 
false positive incidents. This paper focuses on multi-criteria analyses of systems gen-
erated data in order to predict incidents. We prove that system generated monitoring 
data are an appropriate source to analyze and allow for much more focused and less 
computationally intensive monitoring operations. By using appropriate mathematical 
methods to analyze stored data, it is possible to obtain useful information. During 
our work, some interesting anomalies in networks were found by utilizing simple 
data correlations using monitoring system Zabbix. Afterwards, we prepared and pre-
processed data to classify servers and hosts by their behavior. We concluded that it is 
possible to say that deeper analysis is possible thanks to Zabbix monitoring system and 
its features like Open-Source core, documented API and SQL backend for data. The 
result of this work is a new approach to analysis containing algorithms which allow to 
identify significant items in monitoring system.
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1. Introduction
This paper explains new and efficient method to analyze and pre-process monitoring systems 
data for advanced analysis using neural networks and machine learning methods. Well-trained 
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neural network can predict known and unknown types of incidents with high probability, and 
warn administrators before these occur. Other approaches exist and they are based on arti-
ficial intelligence that can be used for this purpose, for example, a Markovian model-based 
solution is described in [1, 2]. A swarm intelligence-based solution is presented in [3, 4]. It is 
also possible to identify the cause of the problem, for example, when indicator (e.g. free disk 
space) is out of range but the actual cause is elsewhere (the attack on a specific service). The 
big advantage of using network and system monitoring tools is that the basic correlation rules 
are already in monitoring systems as these are typically setup to inform administrators about 
abnormal behavior that could impact system availability.
There are many different monitoring systems. All the principles written here are theoreti-
cally applicable to any monitoring tool, however, we selected Zabbix, an Open-Source proj-
ect. The main selection reason is the proper organization of internal data and history in this 
system, the possibility of in-depth, focused and automated analyses directly using SQL and 
open API.
We created an Open-Source tool Monda. Its primary purpose is a selection and pre-processing 
of Zabbix data allowing use of more sophisticated mathematical methods and procedures. 
The project is hosted on Github.com server and is accessible to the entire community. The 
project currently has 6200 lines of source code. It has been designed for team collaboration 
and allows adding of new analyses.
2. Methods
We can say that if we want to operate a network uninterrupted for a long term, a monitor-
ing system is a crucial part of the successful way to accomplish this. We need to monitor and 
track most of network equipment and servers to have a good footprint of network. The mere 
recording of network logs is important, but without monitoring it is ineffective. It can occur 
very often that some data source (from some security probe) is missing due to failure. If we 
do not monitor this, network seems to be without problems even if there is a security incident 
on the background.
There is yet another reason for network monitoring. If an attacker knows where security 
device is located and he knows its vulnerabilities, he can focus first attack directly there. If 
this attack is successful, security device is not functioning properly and there is no monitoring 
enabled, administrator cannot be informed about this and next attacks.
There are software and hardware platforms that are able to detect anomalies in network traffic 
by inspecting packets or streams [5]. Similarly, there are platforms which are able to analyze 
the log files [6]. Their disadvantage is mostly narrow focus. Even if information from flows is 
very important, it is usually not enough for deeper analysis because there is no further infor-
mation, such as load for each server or network elements. Modern devices are able to classify 
traffic based on the days of the week and time of day to respect common usage in networks 
based on work hours and work days. It is even possible to use special probes as source of data 
for monitoring systems like VoIP attack analysis [7–9].
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3. State of the art
There is a lot of tools to identify and classify network incidents but there is no tool based on 
data from monitoring system. We choose Zabbix and data from Silesian University to do fur-
ther analysis of data because of their availability and because of Zabbix features.
Generally, the security must be carried as close to the potential problem as possible to ensure 
the best possible efficiency of the security measures. The local network is required to employ 
properly set up measures against spoof attacks and enable general ban of unsafe services 
that are not used. Well-configured network should not allow trivial attacks like faking MAC 
addresses, IP addresses or ARP. As an opposite, in carrier level network, there has to be only 
limited amount of security measures. A typical example of the attacks on the carrier level where 
the attacks to some news sites in Czech Republic. Even though the stream of data flows across 
most of the big operators, the actual protection against attacks must occur on server itself.
Our goal was to identify interesting data from monitoring system and use them for further 
analysis.
3.1. Zabbix
Zabbix [12] is very common monitoring system developed as Open-Source. It supports vari-
ety of data inputs and can do very flexible operations over these data. In addition, it is very 
flexible report tool. Its internal design varies from other monitoring tools. It is suitable for 
further analysis because all data are available in SQL. Changes in configuration are respected 
automatically and restart of server is not needed to apply them. Most of data are available 
even over JSON API.
Zabbix key features:
• It is possible to monitor almost everything (due to vast protocols support and external 
scripting).
• Configuration and data in SQL.
• Web application monitoring.
• It scales from small setup to huge installations.
• Power: it can monitor thousands of new values per seconds.
• Supports user acknowledgments to problems.
• API for automatized analysis.
4. Design of the system
Mathematical model is based on common principles but for further reading and understand-
ing we used glue between mathematical model and monitoring system. Basic rule for any 
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analysis is correct selection of data. There is a lot of data in monitoring system. Our installa-
tion of Zabbix on Silesian University has approximately 1 TB of data. We cannot use all data 
for analysis and it is not even necessary. It is enough to understand the way how data are 
fetched and stored and how to do basic statistical analysis based these data. After this step, 
called pre-processing, we can do further analysis.
4.1. Anomaly
To be able to search for an anomaly, we have to define it. This can be tricky. If anomaly is 
defined too strictly, we can never find it. On the opposite side, too widely defined anomaly 
will generate a lot of events and computations. It is possible to use trigger priority and trigger 
acknowledgment for this. For example, we can look into problems with priority higher than 
warning which were not acknowledged by users.
There are six trigger priorities in Zabbix.
• Not classified—for events which do not affect network but we want to know about it.
• Information—for events which do not affect network but we want to know about it.
• Warning—for events which can affect network.
• Average—for events which effectively affect network.
• High—for events which can harm network.
• Disaster—for events which has to be solved as soon as possible and have big impact on 
network.
4.1.1. Time window
We have to define Time Window before searching for any anomaly. Some anomalies can last 
for fraction of second, other can be several days long. In addition, some processes in network 
are specific for some hour in day or day in week. We have to take this into account. For 
example, regular backup process can affect entire analysis if we do not consider it as regular 
process. This work primarily focuses on anomalies which have longer time range, it means 
several minutes and hours. This is due to the fact that monitoring system is not suitable for 
very short incidents due to the fact that data are fetched in regular intervals which are at 
minimum 30 s but in most cases it can be several minutes and data inside these intervals are 
summarized.
4.1.2. Item
In conjunction with Time Window, it is appropriate to analyze items separately. For exam-
ple, CPU load on server can be a useful indicator what happens on server. It can have some 
specific features like recurrence, statistical features and some statistical associations in data 
[10]. Simple prediction of value or searching anomalies without external data is not efficient. 
Zabbix can do simple value predictions using linear extrapolation but this will work only for 
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small amount of items due to their features. Zabbix can even evaluate some trigger based on 
simple mathematical formula and values in history. Again, it is not suitable for further analy-
sis without external data. For example, CPU load can vary depending on server usage and it 
is not predictable.
4.1.3. Host
After simple analysis of Item History it is needed to find their correlations within host. Typical 
scenario is dependency between CPU usage, disk load and network interface utilization. This 
combination will be relatively unique for some kinds of applications or servers.
4.1.4. Correlation with events
Previous analyses were independent on events. Item and Host analysis without events did 
not respect overall network functionality, but only one Item/Host values in history. Event 
time and value is very good source of information because we can focus on specific data, time 
and value which caused event to raise.
4.1.5. Correlation with acknowledgments
Event is based on mathematical formula and data from history of Items. There is no human 
feedback. There can be some false-negatives or false-positives due to badly configured trig-
gers. Acknowledgment is good for fine tuning analysis and to filter such false states because 
human (in most situation network administrator) manually tag given event as real problem 
or false state.
5. Algorithms
5.1. Data selection
To be able to focus on and work with huge amount of data, pre-processing is needed. This 
part of analysis is crucial. It would not be possible to do complex analysis over all data in 
monitoring system. And it would not lead to good results. Even for future, pre-processing 
part will be primary place for any optimization and improvements. Mathematical principles 
and formulas are strict and their algorithms are known and well optimized. But pre-pro-
cessing is data specific and has to be driven with focus to data features. There is a lot of data 
inside monitoring system and there are many kinds of it. It can be number, specifying state of 
interface which is integer from 0 to 10, it can be float as processor load or integer which saves 
actual disk free space in bytes. Small change in one item is not important but same change in 
other item can mean big problem in network.
From this reason we have made our own Open-Source software Monda, hosted on GitHub, 
which is highly configurable and which does pre-processing part (but even more). Our goal 
was to create framework and common environment where every user can create his own 
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version of pre-processing strategies based on his setup. After we created and tested Monda, 
it became possible to do further analysis of data focused to Time Window, Host or network 
process. One big advantage of this software is that it can be automated.
Primary goal of our work is in innovative approach to selection and pre-processing of data 
using algorithms above. We used dimensionless quantity LOI (Level Of Interest), which is inte-
ger. Bigger LOI means more interesting data. Algorithms and formulas used will be explained 
later. Further mathematical analysis is based on LOI. When doing some complex computation, 
objects with highest LOI are selected first. If there is enough CPU, RAM and disk size, it is the-
oretically possible to analyze all data inside or all data for specific Time Window only. But LOI 
will do preview of data inside Zabbix and selects most interesting data for further analysis.
5.2. Algorithms and data structures
Data in Monda are structured into Time Windows and Item statistics, see Figure 1. Basic 
feature of Monda is that data in Zabbix are untouched. So computation is based in Zabbix 
database and results from it are saved into Monda database. Monda database only describes 
data in Zabbix and mark them with adequate LOI.
As shown in Figure 1, Item that seems to be important in one Time Window can be uninterest-
ing in another window. Typical example is free disk space. In most Time Windows, there is no 
big change of it. But in specific window where some kind of attack affected it, change can be 
bigger and Item can be interesting at this time. Algorithm used in pre-processing will prefer 
combination of Item and Time Window if there are more changes, see below.
Similar to Time Windows, there can be interesting and uninteresting one. During work hours, 
there is a lot of changes in network metrics and these windows will be preferred. On the 
opposite side, night hours can be skipped because there were no interesting processes.
Figure 1. Organization of data in Monda.
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Step-by-step algorithms follows.
1. Create Time Windows: Monda creates Time Windows either automatically or based on user 
preferences. By default, windows with length 1 hour, 1 day and 1 week are created. Time 
Windows are hierarchical. Week window is parent of 7 single-day windows and each of 
day window is parent of 24 single-hour windows. But even when there is hierarchical 
structure, each window is computed separately.
2. Item Statistics in Time Window: Item statistics is set of data which describes Item history in 
given window. There is information about average, minimum, maximum, standard devia-
tion, number of values, coefficient of variation and LOI. Depending on Item source, data 
can vary very much. For example, processor load can be number from 0 to 100%, size of 
free disk space can be bytes or terabytes. Situation is even more complex because some 
Item’s absolute change can have big impact on network while same change on other Item 
has no impact at all. Even more, absolute value can be big but a small change can have 
impact too. This is typical with counter of errors on interface. Due to some historical rea-
son, there can be thousands of CRC errors on interface but it does not increase in time. But 
when it increases, even a small change should be taken into account. Next problem which 
is related to the fact how monitoring system works is that some items can be fetched in 
30 s interval but other in 10 min interval and even more. While we need to fetch CPU usage 
each 30 s, for disk usage it is enough to fetch it each 30 min.
At this time, algorithm works only with numerical data in Zabbix. It ignores everything else 
than integer or float in history. It is possible that this will change in next versions. Even string 
processing can be useful task to take into account. Next improvement would be to better 
describe data and meta information of Items. It could be possible to mark some data as more 
important directly in Zabbix and instruct Monda to increase LOI of Item even if absolute 
change of it is small.
Item statistics:
• Minimum min(x),
• Maximum max(x),
• Mean avg(x),
  μ =  1 _____ count ∙  ∑ 
i=1
 
count
   x 
i
 (1)
• Standard deviation stddev(x),
  σ =  √ _______________  1 _____ count ∙  ∑i=1 count   ( x i − μ) 2 (2)
• Coefficient of variation CV,
  CV =  σ __μ (3)
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• Number of values count,
• Level of interest LOI
is
  LOI 
is
  = 100 ∙  CV _____ 
 CV 
max
 
 (4)
CV
max
 is configurable with default equal to 100.
The example of the command for the windows with IDs 47,245 and 46,915 looks like follows:
$ monda is:show -w 47,245,46,915 --itemids 1,2.
This command yields, for example, the following data (Table 1):
3. Time Windows: For all Time Windows, Item statistics are computed. It means that for each 
Time Window, Zabbix history is searched, analyzed and computed for all Items found 
inside. Some items are automatically removed at this part of analysis because there is not 
enough data for them in given window. For example, for item “disk free bytes” which is 
fetched every 20 min there is not enough data in 1 hour window (three values) to do any 
usable analysis over it.
There are basic statistics computed for each Time Window, see below. All constants are con-
figurable by Monda. This is first place where data are reduced. Useless data (items with small 
changes, items without history or items with small standard deviation) are not copied into 
Monda database (Table 2).
Time Window Statistics:
• found: overall number of items found in window
• lowcnt: items with low number of values
• lowavg: items with mean which is near to zero
Itemid 1 2
min 0 0
max 1,069,274 48
avg 743 0.03
stddev 28,177 1.28
loi 546 484
cnt 1440 1440
hostid 1 2
cv 37 33
Table 1. Item statistics example.
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• lowstddev: items with small standard deviation
• lowcv: items with small coefficient of variation
• avg.(count): average count of history data per item
• avg.(CV): mean of coefficient of variation
• Level of Interest LOI
tw
 (1)
  LOI 
tw
  = 100 avg (count) avg (CV)   processed ________
found
  (5)
4. Hosts: Just after Time Window statistics, Host statistics are computed. Inside each Time 
Window, all Hosts are found, Items are categorized for them and after this, statistics are 
computed.
Host in Zabbix can be any network device. Herein statistics makes a glue between Items and 
Hosts so it is possible to do Host specific computations in Time Windows. Example of Host 
statistics is in Table 3.
5. Host statistics:
• Number of Items found for Host in Time Window items
• Number of History rows for Host in Time Window cnt
• Level of Interest LOI
hs
  LOI 
hs
  = 100 ∙  count _______  count 
max
  (6)
The example of the command for the windows with IDs 46,965 and 47,241 looks like follows:
$ monda hs:show -w 46,965,47,241 --hostids 1,2.
Length 1 day 1 hour
found 35,863 35,751
processed 4593 1079
ratio 12% 3%
ignored 31,269 34,671
lowstddev 29,281 30,266
lowavg 779 140
lowcnt 105 3794
lowcv 1101 468
Table 2. Time windows statistics example.
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This command yields, for example, the following data:
6. LOI update for all Time Windows: As mentioned above, Zabbix has more information inside 
than only history. There are Events and Triggers. LOI for Time Windows are updated to 
respect this fact. More Events in Time Window lead to bigger LOI.
• Depending on Event time, LOI is increased for each Time Window affected (parameter 
ec_item_increment_loi)
• Depending on Item(s) which caused Event, LOI is increased for each Item (parameter 
ec_window_increment_loi)
• Depending on Hosts where Event was found, LOI is increased for Host (parameter 
ec_host_increment_loi)
7. Correlation Statistics: After marking Items and Time Windows with Loi, correlations are 
computed. From the principle described above, most interesting correlations are com-
puted. It is not possible to compute all of them because combination of all Items is wide. 
Example of such statistics can be found in Table 4. There are two kinds of correlations to 
compute. One is for correlation between Items in specific Time Window and correlation of 
same Item in different Time Windows. First type is to analyze behavior of different values 
in same time while second is to analyze behavior of Item in different times. For example, 
to compare disk space usage in same hours of day.
hostid windowid count items loi type
1 46,965 8956 54 185 switch
2 47,241 1802 24 100 server
Table 3. Host statistics example.
windowid1 47,470 47,443 46,960
windowid2 4747 47,443 46,979
itemid1 server:cpu[user] Switch:Ifln[“125”] Server:cpu[iowait]
itemid2 Server:cpu[iowait] Switch:IfOut[“77”] Server:cpu[iowait]
corr 0.97 0.93 0.76
cnt 60 141 60
loi 155 94 398
Table 4. Correlation statistics example.
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Correlation does not imply causality. But it is not important at this phase of analysis. Most 
important to know is if two Items correlated in Time Window and if so, how much significant 
this correlation was.
• Correlation within same Time Window
More Items are correlated in same Time Window. For example, how network interface load 
correlated with disk load at given Time Window.
• Correlation within same hour of day
It is common that correlations can occur even between different Time Windows and same 
Item. For example, there can be significant correlation of disk load on backup server at backup 
hours each day. Similar correlations can be found for weekly backups in given day of week. 
Instead of random processes which occurs in Time Windows, these correlations represent in 
most situations recurrent operations in network.
Figure 2. Correlations map: Servers.
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• Correlation statistics
• Number of values found for given correlation cnt
• Pearson correlation coefficient corr which is from interval − 1 to 1
• Level of Interest LOI
hs
  LOI 
ic
  =  |corr| ∙  count 
w
 (7)
while count
w
 is number of next items which correlated in same time.
The example of the command for the windows with IDs 46,965 and 47,241 looks like follows:
$ monda ic:show -w 46,965,47,241 --itemids 1,2.
Figure 3. Correlations map: Switches.
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This command yields, for example, the following data:
5.3. Results of the algorithm
Example of map, created by applying algorithm on data of Silesian University is depicted 
in Figure 2, which shows correlation between servers and their items. Rectangles represents 
servers and ellipses their Items. Connectors between them represent correlation coefficient. 
Data are anonymized for security reasons but correlations are visible. Next fact which is obvi-
ous is that more Items correlate together.
Next example is correlation map of network switch and its ports, see Figure 3. Different ports 
correlate between each other according to network throughput. Switches are represented as 
rectangles, load on their ports are ellipses. Connectors are correlation between loads.
6. Monda
Monda [11] was designed and coded from scratch. It was designed to do most of the computa-
tions directly in SQL. This was crucial to speed up analysis. The result of the analysis is stored 
back to SQL tables, so it is possible to do next quick operation within it. Zabbix server was 
configured not to delete any data. Instead of deleting history data it creates partitions of SQL 
tables in regular intervals.
Monda is used as a tool which concentrates to the significant amount of data in Zabbix data-
base and tries to find most interesting values and windows automatically. As mentioned, it is 
not possible to do a complete analysis with overall data inside in real time. And in fact, it is 
not needed. A lot of data in monitoring system are not interesting.
Monda never copies data from Zabbix. Instead of it, it uses algorithms and procedures which 
operate inside data and copy statistical results into Monda database. At this time, Monda has 
approximately 6200 rows of code.
Overall design rule was not to affect Zabbix server availability or performance. Zabbix uses 
its tables very often and utilizes SQL server by itself. From this reason, it was crucial to take 
care of all Monda operations to work in most situations in idle time of Zabbix server. Next, it 
was needed to set SQL timeout for Monda queries. If Monda analysis takes more than 10 min 
per query, it stops automatically.
7. Conclusion
Interesting results were found during analysis. A new approach to identify network incidents 
was invented. We created software Monda which is Open-Source, and it can be used by any-
body for subsequent kinds of analysis in Zabbix. Verification of methods was done on Silesian 
University data stored in the monitoring database.
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7.1. General results
Data in monitoring system are interesting for subsequent analysis. Even if it is relatively 
complicated to choose right data and right intervals, data are suitable for prediction of some 
incidents. Monda can do pre-processing part very quickly and an effective way directly 
within SQL server. Anybody can write its analysis module to focus on specific incident or 
time. Algorithms used here are mainly based on logical assumptions which are derived from 
knowledge of monitoring system and its data.
Next assumption is that to do better analysis and prediction of incidents, the monitoring sys-
tem must have more inputs about incidents on the network. In other words, more data related 
to security and statistics of systems, better analysis and prediction of incidents.
7.2. Future improvements
More information about stored data and their source means better pre-processing of data. 
One of the improvements could be a manual description of Items inside Zabbix so pre-pro-
cessor could know right ranges for given Items.
Next, it would be nice if Zabbix could do data approximation on historical data. Zabbix 
deletes data from history after configured amount of days and computes trends from it. So 
we can see minimum, maximum and average in hour intervals. If Zabbix uses approximation 
function, it is possible to describe data at summarized intervals better.
It is possible to use SOM in future for better fingerprinting of Hosts. But it needs more inves-
tigations and more data of separated Zabbix servers to do so.
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